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tor for reasonable costs incurred in the performance of the contract.
There is, therefore, ample authority on the part of the Government to
disallow unreasonable costs or profits earned under CPPC subcontracts without resorting to the necessity of reading into the law a
provision with respect to subcontracts which does not appear therein.
By disallowing the portion of a CPPC subcontract considered unreasonable, the original purpose of Congress will have been fulfilled.
The disallowance of the entire amount of subcontracts solely because
they are on a CPPC basis, without any consideration of the value of
the goods and services rendered the Government, would be taking
advantage of a technicality in direct violation of the trust relationship
inherent in every CPFF prime contract.
Congress has repeatedly recognized that the present emergency
involving our national defense, calls for a high degree of cooperative
confidence and trust by each contracting party in the other to insure
the successful accomplishment of vital war contracts. This policy is
expressed in the Contract Settlement Act of 1944,13 wherein it is
provided that "Whenever any formal or technical defects or omission
in any prime contract, or in any grant of authority to an officer or
agent of a contracting agency who ordered any materials, services,
and facilities might invalidate the contract or commitment, the contracting agency (1) shall not take advantage of such defect or omission; (2) shall amend, confirm, or ratify such contract or commitment without consideration in order to cure such defect or omission;
and (3) shall make a fair settlement of any obligation thereby created
or incurred by such agency, whether expressed or implied, in fact or
in law, or in the nature of an implied or quasi contract."
If the Comptroller General's decision in the Day and Zinmwrmnan
case were applied to the numerous subcontracts entered into on a
CPPC basis, the Government would be prohibited from reimbursing
contractors for any portion of the cost of such subcontracts regardless
of the fact that the prices were reasonable and that the goods had
been received and used by the Government. Unless the decision in
the Day and Zimnerman case is Teversed, war contractors will sustain a loss of millions of dollars, in direct violation of the expressed
intent of Congress-to conduct war contracting on a fair and equitable
basis.
RAPHAEL j. MUSICUS.
THE DOCTRINE OF "THE LAST CLEAR CHANCE"

As an outgrowth of society's high regard for persons and property, the doctrine of "the last clear chance" was formulated in England and later adopted by the courts of the United States. In effect,
the rule prescribes a course of conduct demanded by society when
situations arise wherein one of its members, through negligence or
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otherwise, finds himself in a perilous and dangerous situation with no
means of escape from the danger, and the other has it within his
power and control to aid him in averting the peril by controlling his
own negligence, thereby negativing the ill effects of the negligence of
the other. In the course of events, society, manifesting itself through
law, regards the one confronted with the peril, when incapable of
saving himself, as helpless and at the mercy of the other, and demands
that the other act with dispatch and come forth with his aid and
assistance if he has knowledge of the perilous situation and controls
the means of avoiding it.
In one of the earliest leading English cases, Davies v. Mann,'
the doctrine of "the last clear chance" was formulated and applied.
In that case the plaintiff turned his donkey out to graze along the
public highway where defendant through his negligent driving ran
his cart over the animal. It was held that although plaintiff had been
negligent in permitting the donkey to be upon the road, nevertheless,
after the animal's peril was discovered by the defendant and it was
obvious that the plaintiff was powerless to avert the danger to his
property, defendant's subsequent failure to employ proper care made
him liable. It will be noted that discovery of the peril was the determining factor in this case which, in spite of plaintiff's negligence,
brought into being defendant's duty of care and made his negligence
the proximate cause of the harm. This duty sprang from defendant's
knowledge that plaintiff's property was in a perilous situation and
that plaintiff was helpless to save it from damage while defendant had
it within his means to save the same from destruction by controlling
his cart and avoiding contact with the animal. Thus, but for his
negligence the accident might not have occurred.
The doctrine of "the last clear chance" as developed by the English courts, has found application in a large number of American
states, but there is a sharp division on the extent of its application.
The majority of jurisdictions allow a wider scope to the principle of
"last clear chance" and hold the defendant to the duty of ascertaining
the plaintiff's perilous predicament if, in the exercise of reasonable
care, it would have been discovered and, if the relation of the parties
is such that the defendant owes to the plaintiff the duty of reasonable
vigilance. Under this rule, a plaintiff who has negligently exposed
himself to a danger from which he is unable at the time of the accident
to extricate himself. may hold a defendant who as a reasonable man
should have discovered the plaintiff's danger at any time after the
situation has gotten beyond the plaintiff's power to save himself, if
such discovery would have enabled the defendant by the exercise of
reasonable care, to have avoided the accident.2 The one exception
1 10 M. & W. 546, 152 Eng. Repr. 588 (1842); cf. Radley v. London &
N. W.
R. R. Co., L. R. 1 App. Cas. 754 (1875).
2
Teakle v. San Pedro & L. A. R. R. Co.. 32 Utah 276, 90 Pac. 402, 10
(N. s.) 486 (1907) ; BOHLEN, CASES ON TORTS (3d ed.) 538; HARPER,

L. R. A.
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to this rule is a trespasser. In that case the duty under the doctrine
does not come into being because there is no legal relation between
the parties.
The minority, New York included, confine it to situations in
which the defendant actually discovers the plaintiff's perilous situation
and thereafter fails to use with reasonable care his ability and facilities to avoid the accident. This doctrine is sometimes known as the
doctrine of "discovered peril". If the defendant fails to discover the
plaintiff's peril, the plaintiff's contributory negligence will disentitle
him to recover as it is an effectual insulation to the defendant's negligence. Such a qualification makes the situation akin to cases in
which the defendant has been guilty of reckless and wanton misconduct and the result reached is the same, for mere contributory" negligence on the part of the plaintiff will not bar a recovery if the defendant's misconduct has been so gross. Such conduct differs from
negligence in that the actor knows and is fully conscious that his
conduct involves a grave risk, whereas in merely negligent conduct
the actor does not realize the danger to others but, as a reasonable
man, should recognize the nature and extent of the risk involved.
There is a shade of difference between gross negligence and negligence imputed to a defendant under the doctrine of "the last clear
chance". Gross negligence in its essence infers indifference to the
consequences arising out of a hazard created by the actor whether
aware of the peril or not. It implies the doing of an act and irresponsibility as to the consequences ensuing therefrom and dangers
caused thereby. It implies indifference to duty and gross disregard
of the rights of others. Negligence arising through the application
of the doctrine of "the last clear chance" is not negligence in essence,
but becomes negligence only when there is an awareness of the dangerous position of another and there is at the same time an opportunity to sidetrack the peril. It becomes negligence only because the
law places a duty where none ordinarily existed.
A most recent New York case, Elliott v. N. Y. Rapid Trauit
Corporation,3 decided June 14, 1944, best illustrates the interpretation
given the doctrine by the New York courts.
In that case, deceased in a four plus alcoholic condition (52%
alcohol in the brain) boarded one of defendant's elevated trains on
the 5th Avenue Culver line in Brooklyn, and, because of his condition, mistakenly alighted from the train one station beyond the station
nearest his home. When the train stopped, the conductor, being
aware of his condition, saw the deceased stagger out of the car, and,
when the deceased stopped to speak to him, told him to step away,
and shut the gates, at the same time giving the motorman the signal
to go ahead. When the train had gone one foot, deceased realizing
his mistake took hold of two stanchions extending from the platform
to the roof of the first and second cars, at a height of about 6 feet
3293 N. Y. 145, 56 N. E. (2d) 86 (1944).
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3 inches. He was carried with his feet "dangling" for 53 feet before
he lost his hold and fell to the catwalk and thence to the street, while
the train continued on for 27 feet before the emergency brake brought
it to a standstill. At the trial it was shown that a pull upon the
emergency brake cord, only one step away from the conductor, would
have stopped the train within 20 to 25 feet, and that the emergency
brake cord was operated without relation to the motorman so that a
pull upon the brake cord took control of the train from the motorman,
and placed it at the disposal of the conductor whose actions under the
circumstances meant life or death to helpless plaintiff.
The court said that "the doctrine of last clear chance" is predicated upon the fact that knowledge of the peril as an actual fact has
been brought home to the person charged with the subsequent negligence. As was stated by Justice Cardozo in the case of Woloszynowski v. New York Central R. R. Co.: 4

The doctrine of the last clear chance, however, is never wakened into
action unless and until there is brought home to the defendant to be charged
with liability, a knowledge that another is in a state of present peril, in which
event there must be reasonable effort to counteract the peril and avert its
consequences 5 ....
but knowledge there must be, or negligence, so reckless,
as' to betoken indifference to knowledge.

The Court of Appeals, in reversing the judgment of the Appellate Division which had affirmed the judgment of the Supreme Court
dismissing the complaint on the merits, said that the instant case fell
squarely within the province of the doctrine of "the last clear chance".
There, plaintiff had made out a prima facie case by showing:
(1) That the conductor had knowledge of decedent's perilous
situation, which knowledge plaintiff established beyond doubt by the
conductor's own testimony taken upon an examination before trial.
(2) That with knowledge of the perilous situation defendant
failed to use reasonable care. This the plaintiff was able to establish
(prima fade) by showing that although the train could have been
brought to a stop within 20 or 25 feet if reasonable care was used,
the conductor allowed the train to move 53 feet after he knew of the
peril before he pulled the emergency brake, and that thereafter the
train travelled 27 feet before coming to a full stop.
(3) That the failure to use reasonable care was the proximate
cause of the accident and was a question of fact to be determined by
the jury on a new trial. However, the court implied that upon such
trial, .the jury would have no serious difficulty in settling this issue
by quoting the comments on "proximate causation" made by Judge
Pound in the case of Storr v. N. Y. C. R. R. Co.6 wherein he said:

4254 N. Y. 206, 172 N. E. 471, 472 (1930), cited

infra note 9.
5 Wright v. Union Ry. Co., 250 N. Y. 526, 229 N. Y. Supp. 162 (1928);
cf. Bragg v. Central N. E. Ry. Co., 228 N. Y. 54, 145 N. Y. Supp. 1049 (1920).
6261 N. Y. 348, 185 N. E. 407 (1933).
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If one by a negligent act places himself or his property in a position of
danger his negligence does not contribute to defeat his recovery if the situation
was known to the defendant in time to avert the consequences of plaintiff's own
negligence. In such case defendant's negligence is the sole cause of the injury.

It must not run on "inert and callous" and cause an accident which proper care
might have avoided.
Because the doctrine of "the last clear chance" is an exception to
tie general rule of contributory negligence, the New York application

of strict construction can well be understood and certain determining
factors must be present before the courts will apply it.
(1) Plaintiff's peril must be absolute, apparent, and he must be
without present means of escape. If plaintiff can avoid the danger,
even though seemingly perilous, the duty of saving himself takes
precedence over defendant's duty to come to his aid.7
(2) Defendant must have absolute knowledge of the peril and a
sufficient opportunity to avoid it else the doctrine of "the last clear
chance" is not applicable. s
(3) Defendant must, if he is able, attempt to avoid the peril once
knowledge of it is brought to his attention; he is not liable, after an
attempt in good faith, for errors of judgment.9
It is very difficult for students of the law to reconcile the doctrine of "the last clear chance", which is an exception to the contributory negligence rule, with the general rule itself. Under the contributory negligence rule, a plaintiff who has aided in the happening
of a wrong is barred from maintaining a civil action for damages principally because there is a reluctance on the part of the law to apportion a mutual wrong. The "clean hands" doctrine will not permit a
negligent plaintiff to recover for his own wrong, and the policy of the
state makes the personal interests of parties dependent upon their
care and prudence.
Keeping both rules in mind, it can readily be seen that the exception must of necessity remain within its defined limits so as to prevent
an eventual abrogation of the principal rule-this explains the New
York policy of strict construction. It would seem, therefore, that we
are confronted with two rules-both inconsistent with each other.
Negligence in one case destroys the cause of action, while in the other
case, even though negligence is conceded, the cause of action may be
maintained. This seemingly irreconcilable discrepancy in the law
may best be explained by comparing the circumstances arising under
each case. In the first case, plaintiff's negligence occurs simultaneously with defendant's, or is so close to the happening of the event
complained of, that defendant is either taken by surprise or else is not
aware of the existing peril in time to avoid its harmful consequences.
Panarese v. Union Ry. Co., 261 N. Y. 233, 185 N. E. 401 (1933).
Wright v. Union Ry. Co., 250 N. Y. 526, 166 N. E. 310 (1928).
Woloszynowski v. N. Y. C. R. R. Co., 254 N. Y. 206, 172 N. E. 471
(1930), cited supra note 4.
8
9
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In that case, as between two wrongdoers the negligence of the plaintiff is the proximate cause of the harm and he cannot be heard to
complain. In the other case, howevdr, the plaintiff's negligence, continuing or otherwise, is known to the defendant in time to avoid the
harmful consequences, and by means of the creation of a new legal
duty the courts reason that the moment the defendant learns of plaintiff's precarious predicament, if he has the opportunity to aid, there is
a shifting of responsibility from plaintiff to defendant. The defendant's conduct under such circumstances, if reasonable care is not
used, becomes the proximate cause of the harm and the basis of defendant's liability, all of which is in keeping with the policy of this
state not to condone, tolerate or even countenance "inert and callous"
conduct.
KATHERINE BITSES.

STATES' RIGHTS AND FIRE INSURANCE REGULATION

In recent years the States' Rights doctrine had been a relatively
unimportant political factor only treated by the dissenting opinions 1
of Justices Holmes and Brandeis who sought to protect and define the
rights of the states to regulate industry and commerce in the public
interest. The revival of the doctrine as a political and economic issue
occurred during the past decade when opponents of the social legislation, inaugurated to meet the crises of depression and war, used this
doctrine as a weapon to discredit these laws as tending to usurp the
powers of the states.2 Recent examples of this type of attack have
been the defeat of the Federal Ballot Bill 3 and the scrapping of the
bill providing for federal supervision and administration of compensation to returning servicemen. 4 On the constitutional scene the
United States v. South-Eastern Underwriters' Association cases
brought this conflict to a head. The response evoked by this decision
affords an excellent illustration of the fact that the present controversy conforms to the historical pattern of the States' Rights doctrine
being used as a political weapon and as a means of beclouding the
true nature of the economic interests involved.6
'Tyson Brothers United Ticket Offices, Inc. v. Banton, 296 U. S. 315.
71 L. Ed. 718 (1926) ; Weaver v. Palmer, 270 U. S. 402, 70 L. Ed. 654 (1925) ;
Western Union v. Kansas, 216 U. S. 1, 54 L. Ed. 355 (1909); Madisonville
Traction Co. v. St. Bernard Mining Co., 196 U. S. 239, 49 L. Ed. 462 (1904);
cf. Hopkins Federal Savings & Loan Ass'n v. Cleary, 296 U. S. 315 (1935).
See CoUDERT, F. R.. THE NEW
3 GREEN-LucAs BILL § 1612.
2

DEAL AND THE SUPREME COURT

(1936).

4 MURRAY-KILGORE-CELLER BILL § 2061.

-"United States v. S.E.U.A.. 322 U. S. 533, 64 Sup. Ct. 1162 (1944).
6 For historical treatment see THE STATES' RIGHTS FETISH, SCHLESINGER
NEW

VIEWPOINTS IN AMERICAN HISTORY

(1926)

220-244.

